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We investigate how different designs of carbon offset mechanisms, like the
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), affect the suc-
cess of self-enforcing climate treaties. In a game-theoretic numerical model
of coalition formation we find that participation in the agreement is negati-
vely affected when strategic behavior and free-rider incentives matter. This
does not change when selling targets restrict credit supply. Substantially
higher participation emerges when the treaty restricts its signatories not to
use the gains from credit trading to lower their emission caps. Despite the
high sensitivity of participation to different CDM design, we find that
global welfare levels achieved in various equilibria are remarkably similar.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Kyoto Protocol introduced three flexible mechanisms. The emission
trading system (ETS) and joint implementation (JI) allow trading in emission
entitlements among Annex I countries, those countries which accepted emis-
sion ceilings. In contrast, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) pro-
vides an opportunity for Annex I countries to buy emission credits from
non-Annex I countries, i.e. mainly developing countries, which have not
accepted emission ceilings. The CDM includes an additionality clause which
requires that emission credits offered by non-Annex I countries must corre-
spond to a reduction of emission levels ‘below [what] would have occurred in
* Manuscript received 18.10.12; final version received 6.9.13.
† This work was in part funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research
(BMBF promotion references 01LA1121A), which is gratefully acknowledged.
The Manchester School Vol •• No. •• ••–•• •• 2013
doi: 10.1111/manc.12045
© 2013 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
1
the absence of the registered CDM-project activity’ (UNFCCC, 2002, p. 43).
All three flexible mechanisms provide opportunities to save abatement costs.
This is in particular true for the CDM because the difference in marginal
abatement costs between Annex I and non-Annex I countries is likely to be
large. On the one hand, Annex I countries have to resort to increasingly costly
abatement options to meet their emission caps. On the other hand, non-
Annex I countries do not face such constraints on their emissions. Addition-
ally, they typically face less steep marginal abatement cost functions
compared with Annex I countries.1 As compliance costs are a major obstacle
for signing ambitious climate treaties, one is inclined to expect that all flexible
mechanisms, and in particular the CDM, should have a positive effect on the
incentive to sign a climate treaty. However, the question arises whether this
conclusion is also true when departing from the assumption of a first-best
world, explicitly considering strategic effects and the need for self-enforcing
treaties due to the lack of a supranational enforcement power. Given the
current efforts to negotiate a post-Kyoto agreement, it is therefore of great
importance to understand how the design of offset mechanisms will affect
participation and the success of future climate treaties.
In a strategic context, there are at least two reasons why a credit trading
scheme between members and non-members of a climate treaty may not have
the intended positive effect on the success of a climate treaty. First, the option
of emission credit trading will affect equilibrium emissions of members and
non-members. If abatement cost savings translate into more ambitious abate-
ment targets of members and this is matched by less ambitious abatement
targets by non-members, free-riding might become more attractive. This is an
equilibrium effect associated with carbon leakage. Second, CDM trading
implies efficiency improvements and therefore gains from trade, but these
gains are in general unevenly distributed between members and non-
members. When the CDM seller rather than the CDM buyer realizes most of
the gains, the effect on the treaty may be negligible.
The first issue can be addressed by restricting the members’ choices of
emission allowances such that the gains from trade are not used for the
implementation of more ambitious abatement targets. The second issue could
be fixed through the implementation of selling targets.2 If non-Annex I coun-
tries can only sell emission credits that correspond to emission reductions
below baseline emissions, a share of the gains from trade can be shifted to the
members, making it more attractive for members to stay in a climate treaty
and/or for non-members to join a treaty. We investigate the different options
in a systematic way.
1This is for instance illustrated by the marginal abatement cost curves from two integrated
assessment models reported in Criqui et al. (1999).
2Selling targets (Kim and Baumert, 2002), similar to non-binding targets (Philibert, 2000) and no-
lose targets (Meckling and Chung, 2009), specify an emission path relative to a baseline with
the understanding that only below this emission path emission reductions can be sold as credits.
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Our paper draws on two strands of literature. The first strand analyzes
the stability of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. This
literature goes back to Hoel (1992), Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993). Since then various departures from the standard model have been
analyzed which include for instance trade in commodities (Eichner and Pethig,
2013a) and trade policies (Barrett, 1997; Lessmann et al., 2009; Eichner and
Pethig, 2013b), linking environmental agreements to negotiations on other
issues in general (Folmer et al., 1993) and to cooperation in research and
development specifically (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997; Botteon and Carraro,
1998; Lessmann and Edenhofer, 2011), a minimum participation clause
(Carraro et al., 2009; Weikard et al., 2009), multiple agreements (Finus and
Rundshagen, 2003; Asheim et al., 2006; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006) and
modest emission reductions (Barrett, 2002; Finus and Maus, 2008). The two
papers closest to ours are Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) and Hoel and
Schneider (1997). However, the first paper analyzes emissions trading only
among coalition members, and not among coalition members and outsiders as
we do. The second paper considers the possibility that coalition members buy
additional emission reductions from non-members, even though Hoel and
Schneider (1997) do not use the term CDM. But, as argued in Finus (2003, pp.
116–118), this paper suffers from a couple of conceptual shortcomings which
by construction lead to smaller coalitions through the CDM.
The second strand of literature analyzes the strategic incentive under a
permit trading scheme with endogenous choice of emission allowances,3 but
stability of treaties is tested in a rather simplistic way. In a stylized model,
Helm (2003) compares the Nash equilibrium among individual countries in a
scenario without trading to a scenario in which permit trading is anticipated.
He shows that the effect of permit trading on global emissions is ambiguous:
countries with steep damage-cost functions may abate more but countries
with flat damage-cost functions may choose larger emission allowances. His
results are driven by countries’ anticipation of how their allowance choices
influence the equilibrium permit price and hence their revenues from trade.
Furthermore, he shows that even if the scenario with permit trade would
reduce emissions globally, this scenario may be vetoed by individual coun-
tries because it makes some of them worse off. And, conversely, a scenario
implying higher global emissions may be endorsed by all countries due to its
welfare enhancing effect. However, in Helm (2003), the decision whether to
participate in an agreement abstracts from strategic membership decisions
and is only based on the concept of profitability, similar to the analysis
conducted in Carbone et al. (2009), who base their analysis on a calibrated
3Additional considerations when several individual carbon markets exist are discussed in
Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010). They analyze how different market designs influence the
success of linking domestic carbon markets across borders in the face of economic and
political obstacles. In the present paper, we assume a common perfect carbon market to be
in place and study its strategic implications on coalition formation. Departures from this
assumption are briefly discussed in Section 5.
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CGE model. Moreover, in Carbone et al. (2009) and Helm (2003) the design
of an agreement is different from our game-theoretic model of coalition
formation. In our paper, members of an agreement cooperate and internalize
the externality among themselves (though not with respect to outsiders).
In contrast, in those two papers, countries entering an agreement just
benefit from the possibility of permit trading, but all countries decide non-
cooperatively on their emission allowances before trade takes place.
In what follows, in Section 2, we first discuss the set-up and develop an
intuitive understanding of the main driving forces. Then we informally intro-
duce our numerical model in Section 3 and provide the details in the Appen-
dix. Section 4 reports and discusses our results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 MODEL: SETTING, POLICY OPTIONS AND DRIVING FORCES
2.1 Coalition Formation Game
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of various designs of the
CDM on the success of self-enforcing international environmental agree-
ments. We follow the mainstream of the literature and model an agreement as
a two-stage cartel formation game with N players. The game is solved by
backwards induction. In the first stage, players decide on membership, i.e.
whether to sign an agreement and hence become a coalition member (which
we sometimes also call signatory), or to remain a non-member (to which we
refer sometimes also as non-signatory), acting as a singleton. In the second
stage, players decide on their economic strategies. In our model, this means
that countries decide on the number of emission allowances they issue to their
industry, taking into consideration the possibility of exporting excess allow-
ances or importing allowances if they are short, as this follows from the
market equilibrium in the CDM market.
In the second stage, we solve for a Nash equilibrium between the coali-
tion and the remaining players, often termed Partial Agreement Nash equi-
librium (PANE, Chander and Tulkens, 1995) in the specific context of a single
coalition, a special case of the social coalitional equilibrium (Ichiishi, 1981).
This implies that the coalition de facto acts as a single player, coordinating
strategies such as to internalize the externalities among their members. Non-
members simply maximize their own welfare. To determine the first stage, we
apply the concept of cartel stability following d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz
(1986). In equilibrium, players have no incentive to revise their membership
strategy, given the strategies of other players. That is, a coalition is internally
stable if no member has an incentive to leave and externally stable if no
non-member wants to join the coalition. Note that for symmetric players,
following Hoel (1992) and Finus and Maus (2008) stability can be compactly
summarized by a stability function:
Φ = − −∈ ∉W n W ni S i S( ) ( )1 (1)
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with a coalition of n symmetric members being internally stable if the stability
function Φ is non-negative at n and externally stable if it is negative at n + 1
and where S denotes the coalition and Wi individual welfare of player i.
The details of the underlying economic model are further explained in
Section 3 and all details are provided in the Appendix.
2.2 CDM Policy Designs
In our model, all regions can decrease their emissions by lowering the emis-
sion intensity of their production. In addition, coalition members have a
second option for mitigating climate change: they can buy permits on the
international CDM market. This is implemented through the choice of emis-
sion allowances for all regions. A region’s actual emissions may exceed its
allowances if the shortfall is matched by imported emission permits. Like-
wise, regions may export emission permits, selling surplus emission allow-
ances by choosing lower emissions. In the analysis of different designs of
offset mechanisms, we consider the following scenarios:
NT: As a benchmark, we consider the no-trade (NT) scenario without permit
trade. This allows to explore the incremental effects of allowing for CDM
trade; all discussions of relative effects will be related to the NT scenario.
Note that we also sometimes refer to the non-cooperative equilibrium,
which is different. The NT scenario allows for the possibility of coalition
formation whereas the non-cooperative equilibrium corresponds to the ‘all
singletons coalition structure’, i.e. no coalition has formed.
CDM/ut: This scenario assumes unrestricted trading of CDM credits as an
integral part of the climate treaty. That is, the coalition maximizes welfare
by choosing emission allowances, taking full account of the possibility of
unrestricted CDM trade.
CDM/rt: The restricted trade CDM scenario assumes that CDM trading is
included in the climate treaty to reduce implementation costs but allow-
ance choices remain at their NT benchmark values. This design requires
the ability of coalition members to commit to constrain emission allow-
ances, similar to the commitment required for minimum participation
clauses, burden sharing rules, or ‘modest’ abatement targets. Essentially,
coalition members only make use of CDM trading to lower their abate-
ment costs, but do not use the gains from trade to choose more ambitious
emission targets compared with the NT scenario.4
Selling targets: We generalize the Kyoto Protocol’s concept of additionality
by introducing selling targets for the CDM supplier. A selling target specifies
reductions relative to the NT baseline scenario that need to be achieved
before any emission credits can be sold in the CDM market. We refer to a
selling target below the NT baseline as being stringent, and a selling target
4See, for example, Courtois and Haeringer (2012).
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above the baseline is said to produce hot air. Our default requirement of
additionality corresponds to the special case of taking the NT baseline as the
selling target, i.e. a selling target sel = 0.0. In contrast, a selling target sel = 0.1
would require 10 per cent additional emission reduction below the NT
baseline.
2.3 General Effects of CDM Trading on Stability of Agreements
In this section, we briefly discuss some general effects of CDM trading on the
stability of coalitions. As CDM trade may raise both the pay-off of members
as well as that of non-members overall conclusions depend on the relative size
of the effects. In the following, we decompose the overall effect into different
driving forces, which, in equilibrium, work simultaneously in most scenarios.
We distinguish three groups of players: (a) members, (b) non-members
and (c) a representative CDM supplier. Members choose their emission
allowances cooperatively and if their actual emissions are in excess of their
allowances, they can buy credits from the CDM supplier. Members who leave
the agreement become non-members. Non-members choose their emission
allowances non-cooperatively but cannot trade credits. Also the CDM sup-
plier chooses emission allowances non-cooperatively and if the actual emis-
sions fall short of allowances, he can sell credits to members. The CDM
supplier does not make a membership decision, although he will only engage
in credit trading if this improves his welfare position compared with the NT
scenario.
Taken together, only the CDM supplier and coalition members sell and
buy permits, but non-members can be indirectly affected through changes of
equilibrium emissions. Three types of effects can be distinguished:
i. Cost-effectiveness Effect. Trade between coalition members and the
CDM supplier occurs whenever the marginal abatement costs of the
CDM supplier are lower than those of coalition members. Then,
the coalition can substitute costly domestic abatement by cheaper CDM
permits thus improving cost-effectiveness of their abatement. If total
abatement efforts remain constant, non-signatories are unaffected by
trade. Overall, it becomes more attractive to stay in the coalition and/or
to join the coalition.
ii. Ambition Effect. If signatories anticipate the options of permit trading,
the possibility of buying credits de facto shifts their marginal abatement
cost curve downward. Consequently, in equilibrium, the coalition will
increase its abatement efforts, choosing lower emission allowances. This
will have a positive effect on signatories but the effect on non-signatories
will be even greater since they will get the extra abatement at zero cost.
Hence, the impact of the ambition effect on the size of stable coalitions
will be most likely negative.
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iii. Leakage Effect. For downward-sloping reaction functions in abatement
space (because abatement levels are strategic substitutes), additional
abatement by signatories will be partially offset by increased emissions
of non-signatories, which is typically called carbon leakage. This under-
mines the benefits of signatories while saving costs of non-signatories.
The leakage effect will clearly lead to smaller stable coalitions.
As the first effect has a positive impact, the third one a negative and the
second one also most likely a negative impact on the stability of coalitions, a
quantitative analysis is necessary to derive more conclusive results. This will
be conducted with a numerical model which is described subsequently.
3 NUMERICAL MODEL
3.1 Basic Setting
We use an extended version of the numerical model MICA (Modeling Inter-
national Climate Agreements) in our analysis, which builds on the multi-
region optimal growth model with international trade presented in Lessmann
et al. (2009). The most important extension concerns the trade of emission
permits. A detailed description of the model can be found in the Appendix.
MICA is an optimal growth model of the Ramsey type with N world
regions. Each region allocates income to either consumption or investment at
every point in time. Regions maximize welfare, which is the net present value
of utility, either as a singleton if they do not belong to the coalition or jointly
if they are a coalition member. We assume a standard utility function, i.e.
utility is increasing in per capita consumption with diminishing marginal
utility and is discounted at the pure rate of time preference. Income stems
from the production of a single good, assuming a neoclassical production
function with capital and labor as factor inputs. Economic growth is driven
by exogenous population growth as well as exogenously improving labor
productivity.
Greenhouse gas emissions are modeled as a byproduct of economic
activities. Total global emissions drive greenhouse gas concentration, which
in turn determines the temperature increase relative to pre-industrial levels.
The damage function, adapted from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), translates
global warming into negative economic impacts. Impacts can be reduced at
the cost of investing in a generic mitigation option, which lowers the emission
intensity of economic production.
An alternative way of meeting emission targets is to buy emission allow-
ances from other regions. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, we impose
two restrictions on emission credit trading between coalition members and
outsiders. (i) Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries that provide CDM credits
must be signatories of the protocol but without abatement commitment (i.e.
they are non-Annex I countries) and conversely non-Annex I countries
Emissions Trading with Non-signatories 7
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cannot offer CDM credits. This is why we distinguish between ‘regular’
non-members and a representative CDM supplier who can offer CDM
credits to coalition members but who will never join the coalition. We assume
that the CDM supplier has little own motivation to reduce emissions.5
(ii) Following the Kyoto Protocol’s additionality clause, we make it a default
requirement that CDM credits represent true emission reductions (as
opposed to so-called ‘hot air’). Additionality is defined in relation to the NT
scenario. We assume a perfectly competitive market of emission credits.
Trade in goods is the means to finance imports of allowances. Goods from
different regions are perfect substitutes.
3.2 Calibration
In this analysis, we restrict our attention to symmetric players as it is common
practice in many stylized models of coalition formation (e.g. Ulph, 2004;
Barrett, 2006; Carraro et al., 2009).6 This renders the analysis much simpler
and in particular more transparent. Nevertheless, we calibrate the model such
that aggregate values (e.g. total global emissions, economic output as well as
greenhouse gas concentration and temperature increase) correspond to those
of other climate-economy growth models, e.g. RICE-2010 (Nordhaus, 2010),
REMIND-R (Leimbach et al., 2010) or WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2006). The
model is run over 250 years in 10 year periods, but reported results relate to the
first 100 years. For instance, in the business-as-usual scenario, which corre-
sponds to the non-cooperative equilibrium with no CDM trade, average
economic growth over the next century is approximately 2.4 per cent (cf. 2.2
per cent in RICE-2010), and CO2 emissions rise from close to 8GtC in 2005 to
about 20GtC in 2105 (cf. 7.8GtC and 19.5GtC in RICE-2010), triggering a
temperature rise by 2.0°C in 2105 with climate change damages amounting to
6.1 per cent of economic output (cf. 2.8°C and 3.3 per cent in RICE-2010). In
contrast, under full cooperative behavior (i.e. all climate change damages are
internalized), global CO2 emissions in 2105 are 13.8GtC; the associated
increase in global mean temperature is 1.5°C with damages amounting to 4.1
per cent of economic output in that year (cf. 2.0°C and 2.3 per cent in
RICE-2010).7
5Technically, we implement this by limiting this region’s perceived climate change damages to a
fraction (1 per cent) of its actual damages (cf. Section Internalization of Damages in the
Appendix).
6More precisely, symmetry applies to signatories and non-signatories, but not to the CDM
supplier for whom we assume much lower perception of damages (1 per cent of the damages
other players face). Hence, in the NT scenario, the CDM supplier’s emission allowances are
much higher than those of all other players and hence his marginal abatement costs are
much lower. Another asymmetry with respect to the CDM supplier is considered in Section
4.7 in the context of a sensitivity analysis.
7Data from RICE-2010 has been taken from Nordhaus (2010) and its supporting material if
possible, and from the available spreadsheet version of the model otherwise.
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4 RESULTS
4.1 NT Baseline
We begin with our benchmark, the NT scenario. The stability function Φ is
shown in Fig. 1, which we may recall is the difference between the welfare of
a player as a member in a coalition with n members, and the welfare when he
leaves the coalition, becoming a non-member, and hence the coalition size is
n − 1 (equation (1)). As mentioned in Section 2.1, a coalition with n symmetric
members is stable if the stability function is non-negative at n and negative at
n + 1. Thus, the stability function of the NT scenario indicates that only a
coalition of two players is stable.
4.2 Unrestricted CDM Trading without Selling Targets (CDM/ut)
Figure 1 also shows how the coalition stability function changes when CDM
trading is part of the agreement and unrestricted (denoted CDM/ut). Evi-
dently, introducing CDM trading is counterproductive for participation as
the stability function lies below the stability function of the NT baseline
scenario, although in this specific example the actual size of the largest stable
coalition still remains at 2, just as in the previous NT scenario.
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Emissions Trading with Non-signatories 9
© 2013 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The reason why stability decreases with CDM/ut is that the ambition effect
identified in Section 2.3 outweighs the benefits from the cost-effectiveness effect
accruing to the coalition (the third effect, the leakage effect, is less important).
Figures 2 and 3 show the interaction of coalition members and CDM supplier
in detail. Without CDM trade (NT scenario), the CDM supplier emits sub-
stantially more than coalition members. But in the CDM/ut scenario, the
CDM supplier reduces emissions down to the same level as the one chosen by
coalition members, in order to sell CDM credits: at this level, marginal
abatement costs equal the permit price. The CDM credits are purchased by the
coalition, but the lower abatement costs are mainly used to realize additional
abatement rather than to replace costly domestic abatement by cheaper one
from the CDM country (cf. member allowance choice in Fig. 2). This behavior
of coalition members is driven by the shape of the marginal damage function,
which is almost flat around the equilibrium. With (nearly) constant marginal
damages, the coalition members simply keep on investing in abatement until
marginal abatement costs reach the level of the sum of marginal damages of
coalition members.
Overall, the abatement cost reduction from CDM trade results in lower
global emissions. Thus, non-members benefit from lower damages. Although
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coalition members also benefit from lower damages due to the increased net
abatement by the coalition, their abatement costs will generally rise due to the
implementation of more ambitious abatement targets. Therefore, the gains
from CDM trade are larger for non-members than for members and hence it
becomes more attractive to leave a coalition of a given size as displayed in
Fig. 1.
4.3 Unrestricted CDM Trade with Selling Targets (CDM/ut/sel)
Figure 4 provides an alternative illustration why CDM trade does not lead to
larger coalitions. It shows the gains from CDM trade, i.e. the increase in
global welfare as measured by the model’s objective function, relative to
welfare in the NT baseline scenario. These gains are unequally distributed
among the different groups of players. For the default value of a zero selling
target, which corresponds to the default additionality assumption, the
welfare gains are appropriated by non-members and the CDM supplier. In
particular, the CDM supplier benefits from selling emission allowances to
coalition members. This is shown in Fig. 4 for a fixed coalition size of two
members, but it also holds for other coalition sizes. This figure also shows
that the coalition members suffer a slight loss of welfare relative to the NT
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scenario. This is a side-effect of leakage: in equilibrium, members buy credits
at their marginal damages, but due to leakage the actual reduction of global
emissions is less. For small coalition, this effects dominates the efficiency
gains from trade, for larger coalitions, this leakage effect vanishes.
Figure 4 also visualizes how the gains from CDM trade may be shifted
from the CDM supplier to coalition members using selling targets. Selling
targets specify emission reductions for the CDM supplier relative to his
baseline emissions projected for this particular coalition size (in our case this
is the NT scenario) that they need to achieve before they are allowed to sell
further reductions into the CDM market. For instance, a selling target of 0.2
implies that the CDM supplier has to reduce 20 per cent compared with
baseline emissions before selling emission credits.
More stringent selling targets shift welfare gains from the CDM supplier
to coalition members. Essentially, by imposing selling targets, the coalition
receives an emission reduction up to the selling target for free and only pays
for additional emission reductions beyond the target. These gains come at the
expense of the CDM supplier. In equilibrium, global levels of welfare and
emissions remain constant for all selling targets because the selling targets do
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Representative Coalition of Two Players
The Manchester School12
© 2013 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
not alter marginal abatement costs and marginal damages, which in turn
determine the equilibrium allocation of abatement.8 This is evident from
Fig. 5, which shows the change in global total emissions (in teratons of
carbon) and welfare (in terms of social welfare as defined by the model’s
objective function) brought about by CDM trade: positive numbers indicate
that CDM trade raises emissions (or welfare).
In view of the fact that selling targets improve welfare of coalition
members, a positive effect of selling targets on stability is very plausible.
Indeed, the stability function for CDM/ut in Fig. 1 would shift upwards with
more stringent selling targets (not shown). However, again, in this example,
the shift is not sufficient to generate stable coalitions larger than two
members. The largest stable coalition therefore remains unchanged.
In summary, the first type of offset design in the form of adding the
CDM to the coalition agreement has a negative impact on coalition stability:
8Similar to the findings in Manne and Stephan (2005), a separability of efficiency and equity (i.e.
the global least-cost allocation of abatement between countries and the distribution of the
associated abatement costs) holds in MICA due to the feature of international trade in
goods.
−0.2 −0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Selling target
G
ai
ns
 fr
om
 C
D
M
 (
w
el
fa
re
)
Global Welfare Change (CDM/ut)
Global Welfare Change (CDM/rt)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
E
m
is
si
on
 c
ha
ng
e 
(T
tC
)
Global Emissions Change (CDM/ut)
Global Emissions Change (CDM/rt)
FIG. 5. Changes of Global Emissions and Global Welfare When Going from the NT Scenario
to the CDM Scenarios for Different Selling Targets. Numbers are for a Representative
Coalition of Four Players, and Welfare Gains are Expressed as the Difference in Aggregate
Welfare between the Scenarios
Emissions Trading with Non-signatories 13
© 2013 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
the benefits from CDM trade are realized on the side of the CDM supplier
rather than on the side of coalition members; more importantly, non-
members’ welfare is increased, which raises the incentive to free-ride. Selling
targets allow to counteract this effect. However, in our model, this is not
sufficient to raise participation above the NT benchmark.
4.4 Restricted CDM Trade without Selling Targets (CDM/rt)
In the previous section it became clear that unrestricted CDM credit trading
exacerbates the free-riding problem because coalition members have incen-
tives to abate in excess of the NT scenario. The alternative design of restricted
CDM trade tries to remedy this problem. CDM trade is introduced solely to
reduce compliance costs for a given level of allowance choices. Essentially,
this places a constraint on coalition members’ emission allowances such that
they cannot fall below their emissions in the NT scenario. Hence, we reduce
the leakage effect and avoid that non-members benefit from additional abate-
ment by the coalition.
Analogously to the CDM/ut scenario, the CDM/rt scenario is illustrated
in Figs 1–3 and 5. In Fig. 1, we see our intuition about the overall effect of
this CDM design confirmed: Coalition stability is improved such that a
coalition of four players becomes stable. For a given coalition size, and for
the default additionality assumption (i.e. a zero selling target) global welfare
gains in the CDM/rt scenario fall short of those in the CDM/ut. This is
because the additional constraint in CDM/rt prevents further abatement by
the coalition compared with the NT scenario. Furthermore, we see that due
to the additionality clause and the restricted trade setting, equilibrium allow-
ances of members and CDM supplier correspond to their NT baseline emis-
sions, and their emissions are higher than under CDM/ut (Figs 2 and 3) for a
given coalition size. We now turn to explore whether selling targets could
shift the stability function even further upward as they did in the CDM/ut
scenario.
4.5 Restricted CDM Trade with Selling Targets (CDM/rt/sel)
The effect of CDM with selling targets on global emissions and welfare (for
a given coalition) is shown in Fig. 5. Selling targets require additional abate-
ment from the CDM supplier before he can sell credits in the market, and the
CDM/rt assumption effectively establishes a lower bound for abatement by
the coalition. Therefore, selling targets reduce global emissions. Since this
moves global emissions closer to the social optimum, it has a positive impact
on global welfare. This is quite contrary to CDM/ut where selling targets only
redistributed welfare gains among players (i.e. between CDM supplier and
coalition members), leaving the global levels of welfare and emissions
untouched. Also in contrast to CDM/ut where members’ gains increase and
non-members’ gains remain constant through an increase in selling targets
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(Fig. 4), now members’ and non-members’ gains increase, but the difference
between both declines with more stringent selling targets (Fig. 6), which may
negatively affect the stability of coalitions.
The intuition for this is as follows: For CDM/rt, members and non-
members benefit from globally reduced emissions. Members also benefit from
a bounty of cheap CDM credits but with more stringent selling targets,
credits become scarcer and more expensive, thus diminishing this benefit. For
negative selling targets (i.e. hot air) this trend is reversed. While the world
may be worse off with negative selling targets for a given coalition size
(Fig. 5) and likewise, also members and non-members (Fig. 6), the negative
effect on non-members exceeds that on members. Both are negatively affected
by higher global emissions. However, for coalition members this is partially
offset by the greater amount of CDM credits which are now available at a
lower price, leading to a stabilization of a coalition of five members for a
selling target of −0.2. Thus, there is a trade-off between environmental effec-
tiveness and participation. The effect is similar to the idea of ‘modest’ emis-
sion reductions analyzed in Finus and Maus (2008). Given this trade-off, it is
therefore important to have a look at the overall effects.
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4.6 The Overall Effect of Selling Targets on Global Welfare
Until now we analyzed the impact of various CDM trading scenarios on the
size of stable coalitions. We also considered for a given coalition size how
selling targets affect the welfare of the three groups in our model, as well as
overall welfare. The impact on individual welfare was useful to understand
how selling targets may change the incentive to leave or join the coalition.
The impact on global welfare was useful in order to understand whether
selling targets could be desirable from a normative point of view. The previ-
ous discussion revealed that effects are not always straightforward and that
there may be trade-offs between the size of stable coalitions and global
emissions. Hence, we now look at the overall effect.
Figure 7 summarizes the effect of credit trading on participation in the
agreement and global welfare. Participation is indicated by the numbers next
to the bullets. The level of welfare achieved in the presence of a given stable
coalitions is scaled from 0 per cent (non-cooperative equilibrium) to 100 per
cent (full cooperation, social optimum). Under the NT scenario, a coalition
of two members achieves a welfare level of about 10 per cent.
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Under CDM/rt, we find a positive effect of CDM credit trading on
participation and global welfare compared with the NT scenario. For CDM/
rt, welfare increases to levels of about 35–40 per cent and membership ranges
between 2 and 5 members. Selling targets have not much impact on global
welfare because more stringent selling targets reduce participation, although
for a given coalition size they increase welfare as discussed above. In fact, as
is evident from Fig. 7, the two opposing effects more or less offset each other.
The CDM/ut scenario is much simpler. The largest stable coalition
always has two members, unless ‘hot air’ undermines stability completely.
Through trading, global welfare increases compared with the NT scenario.
However, as discussed previously, the global welfare achieved by a two-
player coalition is independent of selling targets because selling targets only
redistribute welfare.
Taken together, both CDM/ut and CDM/rt improve upon the NT base-
line, with both achieving similar levels of global welfare, irrespective of selling
targets.
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous analysis, we only considered the case of symmetric players in
order to focus on strategic effects of treaty design without having to deal with
the complications that asymmetry entails. The only departure from symmetry
relates to the CDM supplier for which we assumed a substantially lower
anticipation of climate change damages. This implied that the CDM suppli-
er’s willingness to abate out of self-interest in the non-cooperative and the NT
scenario is much lower than that of all other players. As a consequence, the
CDM supplier has much lower marginal abatement costs before trade takes
place. In this section, we explore a variation of this approach: we start with
the CDM supplier being perfectly symmetric to all other players. Then, we
gradually reduce the CDM suppliers marginal abatement costs (by shifting
them downward) in order to increase the supply of CDM credits.9 To keep
everything else as much the same as possible (i.e. same overall equilibrium
emissions compared with symmetry), and to be able to discuss the effects in
a ceteris paribus manner, we simultaneously reduce the CDM supplier’s
marginal damages (by shifting them downward).10 This means equilibrium
emissions in the CDM supplier region are about the same as before as long as
there is no CDM trade, but once trade is considered more CDM credits are
on offer.11
Figure 8 summarizes the results. Four main conclusions are important.
First, CDM trading improves upon the NT scenario. Second, restricted and
9In terms of the model equations given in the Appendix, this is implemented by increasing the
investment effectiveness parameter ξi in equation (A8).
10Implemented by reducing parameter θ1i of the damage function in equation (A14).
11We owe this scenario to an anonymous referee.
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unrestricted trade do not make much of a difference in terms of the overall
outcome. Third, for restricted trade, there is a trade-off between participation
and welfare for different selling targets. If selling targets do not affect mem-
bership, they improve global welfare. But selling targets may lead to lower
participation. Overall, selling targets cannot really improve the overall
welfare of restricted trade, and are anyway irrelevant for unrestricted trade as
argued above. These three conclusions show the robustness of our conclu-
sions obtained above. Fourth, due to the fact that we can now model the
volume in CDM trade through a variation of heterogeneity between
the CDM supplier and the remaining players, a new facet comes into play.
The larger the degree of heterogeneity and hence the larger the volume in
CDM trade, the larger will be participation and the larger the relative welfare
gains in a stable agreement. Also the difference in relative performance of an
agreement with CDM trade (CDM/ut and CDM/rt) compared with one
without (NT) increases. This last conclusion is in line with intuition: if CDM
trade can improve upon the success of treaty formation in a strategic context
at all, then this improvement will be particularly large for large trade
volumes.
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5 CONCLUSION
This paper investigated how the success of a self-enforcing climate agreement
is affected by emissions trading between Annex I and non-Annex I members
of a climate agreement, as for instance the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol. In a
first-best world, the CDM will clearly have an unequivocally positive effect,
as it lowers total abatement cost. However, in a world with strategic interac-
tions between countries and free-riding behavior, this is less evident. The
interplay of three effects of the CDM—the cost-effectiveness, ambition and
leakage effects—will determine the overall impact on international coopera-
tion, requiring a detailed analysis based on numerical simulations. For
instance, if the gains from CDM trade are higher for non-members than for
members of a climate agreement, participation will actually be discouraged.
For the design of emission credit trading without any restriction (CDM/
ut), we have shown that a negative impact on participation in the climate
agreement should be expected. This can be understood as the unfavorable
domination of the ambition effect over the cost-effectiveness effect: the avail-
ability of low-cost CDM abatement is used by the coalition to implement
additional reductions and achieve lower global emissions, from which all
countries benefit, but only the coalition members bear the costs. But while the
ambition effect adversely affects the incentive to participate, any coalition
that is stable despite this will achieve more emissions abatement than the
comparable coalitions without CDM (NT) or with restricted trade (CDM/rt).
Thus, CDM/ut tends to produce narrow-but-deep climate agreements.
Putting an additional constraint on the CDM supplier country by means
of selling targets (CDM/ut/sel) allows to shift a larger share of the gains from
trade of the CDM towards coalition members. Hence, we should expect that
this improves membership in an agreement. However, in our model this effect
turned out to be too weak to have a significant positive influence on the
performance of the unrestricted CDM.
In view of this negative result, we investigated the alternative CDM
design of restricted trade (CDM/rt) which excludes the possibility that the
coalition countries use CDM trade to achieve more ambitious reduction
targets. And even though for a given coalition size this implies higher global
emissions and hence lower global welfare than unrestricted trade, our model
also showed that this type of CDM has indeed a positive impact on partici-
pation, leading to larger stable coalitions compared with both the no CDM
(NT) and unrestricted CDM (CDM/ut) cases. Compared with the stable
coalitions of the unrestricted CDM design, stable agreements under CDM/rt
are hence broad-but-shallow.
If, in addition, selling targets are introduced under this type of CDM
(CDM/rt/sel), global welfare can be further increased since the CDM supplier
now has to carry out additional abatement (at her own cost) before selling
credits on the CDM market. However, it turns out that the stringency of the
Emissions Trading with Non-signatories 19
© 2013 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
selling target has an ambivalent effect: although a more demanding selling
target always implies higher global welfare for a given coalition size, the size
of the largest coalition that is stable actually becomes smaller. As a conse-
quence, a converse reasoning applies to the role of hot air (i.e. negative selling
targets): while reducing the environmental effectiveness of an agreement,
which clearly leads to reduced global welfare levels, it may at the same time
help to draw additional members into the coalition. This is because it
becomes less costly to comply with the watered down agreement. However,
our simulations showed that the resulting larger coalitions were hardly able
to outperform smaller coalitions without hot air.
Finally, the analysis of the aggregate impact of the different designs of
the CDM on global welfare levels confirmed—as perhaps one of the most
important result of our paper—that both the unrestricted (CDM/ut) and
restricted (CDM/rt) type of CDM lead to significant welfare gains as com-
pared with the no-trade base case (NT) (as long as the amount of hot air
possibly introduced in CDM/rt remains small). When the resulting stable
coalitions are compared across designs, it turns out that both CDM
approaches lead to similar global welfare levels, despite the differences in
participation levels. This remains true for all selling targets and any degree of
heterogeneity we considered. Heterogeneity does, however, make a difference
for the additional global welfare attainable through CDM: the larger the
asymmetry between CDM seller and buyers, the higher the volume of CDM
trade, and hence the higher the gains from agreement formation.
In summary, how an offset mechanism like the CDM is incorporated
into an agreement has far reaching consequences concerning its participation,
the agreement’s ambition, and its distributional implications. Yet, the net
effect in terms of the global welfare achieved when taking all strategic inter-
action into account is surprisingly similar for all the options considered here.
Nevertheless, if high participation is seen as a value in itself, e.g. when the
stable agreement is understood as the part of a process where climate policy
is first ‘broad, then deep’ (Schmalensee, 1998), this could tip the scales
towards the CDM/rt design. However, a full formal analysis to investigate
this point comprehensively would require a model of dynamic membership
and is beyond the scope of this paper.
While our model also shares many restrictions of stylized models, we
think that one of the most interesting extension for future research is this
consideration of dynamic membership. That is, whereas in our model the
membership is a one-shot decision based on discounted utility, one could
allow for the possibility that countries can revise their decision continuously
as in Rubio and Ulph (2007). This would allow to study how the design of
emission credit schemes affects participation in successive climate agree-
ments. It might be that the possibility of offering CDM credits may not pay
in the long run if current CDM suppliers do not accept emission ceilings in a
future climate treaty simply because being a non-Annex I country and CDM
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supplier is more attractive than becoming an Annex I country. Another
interesting aspect would be the impact of the co-existence of and links
between different permit trading schemes, as currently observed in various
regions, like the EU, the USA and Australia, on the formation of climate
treaties. Such an analysis would require to consider coalition formation
games with multiple coalitions as for instance analyzed in Finus (2008) and
Finus and Rundshagen (2003), but such an extension would certainly be
non-trivial in our rich policy setting.
Appendix: Model Equations
In this section, we present the details of our numerical model. The model builds on
Lessmann et al. (2009) and Lessmann and Edenhofer (2011) and is extended to
include the endogenous choice and trade of emission allowances. In the following, we
first describe the model equations, their calibration, and the numerical procedure to
solve the model.
Preferences
The world economy is modeled as a set of N = 9 regions (or players). Players decide in
an intertemporal setting which share of income to consume today and which share to
save and invest for future consumption. Intertemporal welfare Wi and instantaneous
utility function U, which is based on per capita consumption, are given by
TABLE A1
PARAMETERS AND INITIAL VALUES
Parameter Symbol Value
Rate of labor efficiency improvement α 0.023
Income share capital β 0.35
Abatement cost exponent γ 0.2
Emission/concentration conversion factor ζ 0.47
Elasticity of marginal utility η 1
Damage function coefficient θ1i 0.02
Damage function exponent θ2 1.5
Rate of ocean CO2 uptake κ 2.15e-2
Labor efficiency λ eαt
Radiative temperature driving factor μ 8.7e-2
Exogenous rate of decarbonization ν 0.01
Effectiveness of investments in ait ξi 5.0
Pure rate of time preference ρ 0.01
Temperature damping factor ϕ 1.7e-2
Atmospheric retention factor ψ 1.51e-3
Initial labor productivity a0 1
Initial concentration C0 377
Initial cumulative emissions E0 501
Initial capital stock k0 70
Initial labor l0 6.6
Initial temperature change T0 0.41
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where cit and lit denote consumption and labor in region i at time t respectively.
Parameter ρ is the pure rate of time preference, and parameter η denotes the elasticity
of marginal utility.
Technology
The economic output yit in each region is produced with a Cobb–Douglas production
technology F with a capital income share of β. Climate change damages (to be defined
below in equation (A14)) destroy a fraction 1 − Ωit of the production.
y F k lit it it it= Ω ( , ) (A3)
F l k l kit it it it it( , ) ( )= −λ β β1 (A4)
Labor lit is given exogenously, as is labor productivity λit, which grows at a fixed
rate α: λit = exp{αt}. Capital kit accumulates with investments iit, assuming zero
depreciation.
d
dt
k iit it= (A5)
Emissions and Emission Allowances
Greenhouse gas emissions eit are a byproduct of economic activity yit. We assume that
the emission intensity falls exogenously due to technological progress at rate ν.
Beyond this, emissions may be reduced by investments bit into abatement ait, bringing
down the instantaneous emission intensity σit. Parameters ξi describes the effectiveness
of these investments, and γ the effectiveness of the abatement option.
e e yit it t it= −σ ν (A6)
σ γit ita= + −( )1 (A7)
d
dt
a bit i it= ξ (A8)
Emissions can exceed allowances qit, which in our model are chosen endog-
enously by individual regions. Emission allowances may be traded internationally (zit
denotes allowance exports by region i), but we exclude intertemporal banking and
borrowing, i.e. total imported and exported allowances must be balanced in every
period.
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e q zit it it= − (A9)
z tjt
j
∑ = =0 1,… (A10)
Climate Dynamics
Global warming is driven by total global emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere, which
are equal to cumulative total emission allowances ∑i itq . For details on the following
climate equations, see Petschel-Held et al. (1999).
d
dt
C q C C Et jt
j
t t= − − +∑ζ κ ψ( )0 (A11)
d
dt
E qt jt
j
= ∑ (A12)
Equation (A11) translates global emissions into carbon concentration in the atmo-
sphere Ct. Concentration Ct rises with global allowances (like emissions do), where ζ
converts emissions into changes in concentration, and it decreases with the carbon
uptake of oceans proportional (with factor κ) to the increase above the pre-industrial
level C0. The final term limits the ocean carbon uptake (to the fraction 1 − ψ/ζκ in
equilibrium).
d
dt
T C C T Tt t t= − −μ φlog( ) ( )0 0 (A13)
Equation (A13) transforms concentration levels into a global mean atmospheric
temperature increase T. Parameter μ controls the strength of the temperature reaction
due to a change in concentration, whereas parameter ϕ is related to its timing.
Together, they can be interpreted as ‘climate sensitivity’ (μ/ϕ·log2), i.e. the equilibrium
temperature increase due to a doubling of concentration. In view of the inertia of the
climate system, we run the model for 250 years in steps of 10 years.
The climate change damage function Ωit is taken from Nordhaus and Yang
(1996):
Ωit i tT i= +1 1 1 2( ( ) )θ θ (A14)
Parameters θ1i and θ2i describe the vulnerability of region i.
Two sets of ‘book keeping’ equations complete the model: the budget constraints
for consumption and investments for each region at every point in time, as well as the
intertemporal budget constraints ensuring that, over the entire time horizon, the
import value must equal the export value in each region.
y m c i b xit it it it it it+ = + + + (A15)
p m t p x p z tt it t it tz itd d
0 0
∞ ∞∫ ∫= + (A16)
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Variables mit and xit are imports and exports of region i, respectively, and pt and ptz are
the prices of goods and allowances respectively.
Solving the Model for the Game’s Equilibrium
As detailed in the main text, we are considering a two-stage game of coalition forma-
tion in which in the first stage, decisions about membership in an international envi-
ronmental agreement (IEA), and in the second stage decision about emission
allowances are taken by players.
The game is solved numerically by backward induction, i.e. first we compute
PANE for all possible coalitions, then we test these coalitions for internal and external
stability according to the following criteria:
W W i Si S i S i≥ ∈\{ } ( )for internal stability (A17)
W W j Sj S j S j> ∉∪{ } ( )for external stability (A18)
The computation of the PANE in the second stage is complicated by the fact that
we are looking at an intertemporal optimization model, featuring an environmental
externality as well as international trade at the same time. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there are no out-of-the-box solvers available to solve such a model in primal
form. Lessmann et al. (2009) suggest an iterative approach based on Negishi’s
approach (Negishi, 1972). In this paper, we use a modified version of the iterative
algorithm, which works as follows.
Negishi’s approach searches for the social planner solution that corresponds to a
competitive equilibrium by varying the weights δi under the assumption of joint
welfare maximization:12
max
{ , , , , : }i b m x z j N
i i
i
N
jt jt jt jt jt
W
=
=
∑
1
1
…
δ (A19)
subject to equations (A1)–(A15).
Since this approach exploits the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, it
cannot be applied to an economy with externalities. In principle, this problem can be
circumvented by making any external effect on other players exogenous to the model
(converting variables into parameters that are adjusted in an iteration).
In our context, externalities are climate change damages caused by aggregate
global emissions. In the Nash equilibrium, players will only anticipate the effect that
their emissions have on their own economic output, not, however, the effect this has
on other players’ output. We can mimic this in a social planner solution by giving each
player his own perception of the causal link between emissions and global warming.
Instead of equation (A11), which describes one trajectory of concentration Ct, we
introduce N equations for Cit:
d
dt
C q q C C Eit it jt
j i
t t i S= +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ − − + ∀≠ ∉∑ζ κ ψ( )0 (A20)
12Note that the intertemporal budget constraint equation (A16), which contains the (a priori
unknown) market clearing prices, is omitted from the model.
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where the allowance choices of other players enter as a fixed value (a parameter,
indicated by the bar), and are set to the levels of the corresponding variables during
the previous iteration (or some initial value). The sum of allowances in equation (A12)
needs to be adjusted analogously, and the temperature equation (A13) will conse-
quently have N instances of Tit, too. The temperature change Tit, anticipated by player
i, will then enter in equation (A14) instead of Tt.
The so modified model is then solved in a nested iteration: in the inner iteration,
we solve the model for a given vector q qit= ( ) of allowance choices repeatedly,
updating q qit it= at the end of each iteration, i.e. we perform a fixed point iteration of
the mapping q = G(q) where G is the best response of players to the exogenously given
strategy qit of the other players. If the inner iteration converges, it converges to a Nash
equilibrium in allowance choices. However, the markets for allowances and private
goods may not be a competitive equilibrium. This is what the outer iteration achieves.
The outer iteration follows the standard Negishi approach: we adjust the welfare
weights δi in the joint welfare function (equation (A19)) until the intertemporal budget
constraints (equation (A16)) are satisfied. The resulting equilibrium is the desired
PANE.
Numerical Verification of the Equilibrium
We verify the resulting ‘candidate’ PANE equilibrium strategies in emissions and
trade numerically by comparing them to the results of the following maximization
problems:
∀i
i b m x z
i
it it it it it
Wmax
{ , , , , } (A22)
subject to equations (A1)–(A16) and prices pt, ptz.
Deviations of this model from our solution should be only within the order of
magnitude of numerical accuracy, which is what we find (not shown). In particular,
simultaneous clearance of all international markets confirms the competitive equilib-
rium in international trade.
Internalization of Damages
In the model and its solution algorithm outlined above, climate change damages that
occur within a region (or coalition of regions) are fully internalized. However, a region
may not internalize all of the damages occurring on its territory, e.g. due to lack of
information, or if a region represents a large number of countries that do not coor-
dinate their actions. In such cases, full internalization of damages of this group would
overestimate the abatement taken by this player. This point was already made in
Nordhaus and Yang (1996, p. 743). Therefore, they divide the damages perceived by
such a representative player by the number of countries represented by her. This is
implemented in our model in the following way: the anticipated climate change
damages Ωit in equation (A15) are only a fraction 1/ni of the original right-hand-side
of the equation. In equation (A4), we add the remaining damages Ωit that were not
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anticipated, i.e. ( )Ω Ωit it+ instead of just Ωit. The parameter Ωit then needs to be
updated in an iteration to Ω Ωit i itn= −( )1 . Through this procedure, full damages take
effect even though only a fraction is anticipated.
For the calculations in this study, we set ni = 1 for all players but the CDM
supplier, where we chose ni = 100 such that only very little abatement action is taken
in the business-as-usual scenario.
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